Abstract-The design of pricing mechanisms for network resource allocation has two important objectives: 1) a simple and scalable end-to-end implementation and 2) efficiency of the resulting equilibria. Both objectives are met by certain recently proposed mechanisms when users are price taking, but not when users can anticipate the effects of their actions on the resulting prices. In this paper, we partially close this gap, by demonstrating an alternative resource allocation mechanism which is scalable and guarantees a fully efficient allocation when users are price taking. In addition, when links have affine marginal cost, this mechanism has efficiency loss bounded by 1/3 when users are price anticipating. These results are derived by studying Cournot games, and in the process we derive the first nontrivial constant factor bounds on efficiency loss in these well-studied economic models.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N THIS PAPER, we consider a congestion pricing approach to resource allocation in communication networks; see, e.g., [1] for an overview. Congestion pricing mechanisms in networks must tradeoff two competing goals: simplicity/scalability of the mechanism, and efficiency. In this paper, we define a scalable mechanism as one where each user's strategic decision depends only on end-to-end path information, rather than detailed information on individual link states. Efficiency is defined in terms of the aggregate value of a network allocation. The abstraction we consider assumes that each user has a utility function, and each link has a cost function; an efficient allocation is one that maximizes aggregate surplus (aggregate utility less aggregate cost).
Several previous efforts have considered the design of scalable and efficient market mechanisms, with varying degrees of success depending on the assumptions made about the behavior of network users. Kelly and coworkers have shown that as long as users act as "price takers" (i.e., if users do not anticipate the effect of their strategic decisions on the prices), then a simple proportional bidding mechanism can achieve efficient allocations when link capacities are fixed [2] or elastic [3] . The mech-anism asks each user to submit a single bid, which conveys the total payment of that user. In the case of a single link, resources are allocated to users in proportion to the bids submitted. The network case is a graceful generalization of this model, where each user is only required to choose a bid in response to the prices on each available path, rather than on each link of the network.
Since Kelly et al. assume that users are price takers, they ignore the possibility of strategic users that are fully rational and anticipate the effect of their decisions on the link prices. A game theoretic formulation of the mechanisms in [2] and [3] for the case of price anticipating users has been considered for a single link by Johari et al. [4] , [5] , and aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium was shown to be within a constant factor of the maximum possible aggregate surplus. However, the results in [4] and [5] exhibit an undesirable scaling behavior in the network context: in order to ensure a bounded efficiency loss, the authors required that each user submit individual bids to each link in the network, rather than a single bid per path as in the original proposal of [2] , [3] . The ramifications of such a mechanism are that each user must be aware of each link he can potentially use, as well as the prices of those links. If, instead, the user submits only a single bid, Hajek and Yang [6] have shown that the efficiency loss can be arbitrarily high when users are price anticipating.
We close the gap in preceding results, by demonstrating that it is possible to design a network resource allocation mechanism that is scalable and has good efficiency properties when users are price taking, as well as price anticipating. We consider a simple market mechanism for link data rate allocation, where users choose the rates along each path they desire from the network, and optimize their payoff only based on the aggregate price of each path available to them (rather than individual link prices). When users are price taking, this mechanism achieves an efficient allocation. We also show that if every link has an affine marginal cost function the efficiency loss is no worse than 1/3 of the maximal aggregate surplus-regardless of the utility functions of the users. This result is of practical importance: while affine approximations to links' marginal cost are still quite rich, it is unlikely that detailed knowledge of users' utilities will be available. Furthermore, the assumption of affine marginal costs is no more restrictive than the affine latency assumption in the seminal work of Roughgarden and Tardos [7] .
Mechanisms where market participants choose their desired quantities are known as Cournot models [8] . Cournot games are among the best studied economic models for competition between market participants; see, e.g., [9] - [11] for surveys of this rich topic. The results of this paper are among the first constant factor bounds available for Cournot competition models, and thus the analysis of this paper constitutes an important contribution to the existing results in economics as well. Additional bounds using similar techniques can be derived for other economic models of interest, in particular for monopoly pricing with general concave demand, and Cournot oligopoly pricing with affine demand; for details, see [12] .
Our investigation forms part of a broader body of work that quantifies the efficiency loss in environments where participants may be selfish. Results have been obtained for routing [13] , traffic networks [7] , [14] , and network design problems [15] , [16] . We note in particular that Roughgarden and Tardos showed that when nonatomic users selfishly route through a network, and if delays are affine functions of flow on each link of the network, then the average delay is a factor of at most 4/3 higher than the optimal average delay.
The outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we describe the operation of the mechanism for a single link, and establish that when users are price taking the resulting allocation is efficient (a consequence of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics [17] ). We then show that at a Nash equilibrium of this game when users are price anticipating and the link has affine marginal cost, the efficiency loss is no more than 1/3 of the maximal aggregate surplus, regardless of the utility functions of the users; we also show this bound is tight.
We then consider general networks in Section III, where each user chooses the rate at which they wish to send on each available path. It is again the case that price taking users end up maximizing the aggregate surplus. We then establish that as long as all links have affine marginal cost functions, the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is no worse than a factor of 1/3, matching the result of the single-link case.
II. A SINGLE LINK
In this section, we consider a game where multiple users compete for a single link, and where the strategies of the users represent their desired rates. Although it is easy to check that such games can yield arbitrarily high efficiency loss in general [12] , we will establish a bound on efficiency loss in the important special case where the link has affine marginal cost.
Formally, we consider the following model. We assume that users compete for a single link. We assume that each user has a utility function , and that the total data rate through the link incurs a cost characterized by a cost function . We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: For each , and over the domain , the utility function is concave, nondecreasing, and continuously differentiable (where we interpret as the right directional derivative of at 0). Assumption 2: There exists a differentiable, convex, nondecreasing function over , with and as , such that for
In particular, is convex and nondecreasing.
We assume that both utility and cost are measured in monetary units, so that an efficient allocation is characterized as an optimal solution of the following optimization problem:
We refer to the objective function (1) as the aggregate surplus [17] . Since as , while only grows at most linearly, it follows that an optimal solution exists.
We now consider the following pricing scheme for resource allocation. Each user chooses a desired rate . Given the vector , the link sets a single price . User then pays . We first consider the case where, given a price , user chooses to maximize (3) Notice that in the previous expression, each user is acting as a price taker; that is, he does not anticipate the effect of a change in his strategy on the resulting price. Since we are using marginal cost pricing, i.e., since , we expect that price taking users will maximize aggregate surplus at a competitive equilibrium. This is formalized in the following proposition, a special case of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics [17] . This result is similar to that proven by Kelly et al. in [3] for a proportionally fair pricing scheme, where users choose the total amount they are willing to pay, rather than their total rate.
Proposition 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. There exists a competitive equilibrium, that is, a vector and a scalar such that , and
Any such vector solves (1) and (2) . If the functions are strictly concave, such a vector is unique.
Proposition 1 shows that with marginal cost pricing, and if the users of the link behave as price takers, there exists a vector of rates , where all users have optimally chosen their , with respect to the given price ; and at this "equilibrium," the aggregate surplus is maximized.
When the price taking assumption is violated, however, the model changes into a game and the guarantee of Proposition 1 is no longer valid. Consider, then, an alternative model where the users of a single link are price anticipating, rather than price taking, and play a Cournot game to acquire a share of the link. We use the notation to denote the vector of all rates chosen by users other than ; i.e.,
. Then, given , each user chooses to maximize
The payoff function is similar to the payoff function , except that the user now anticipates that the price will be set according to . A Nash equilibrium of the game defined by is a vector such that for all (6) We first show that a Nash equilibrium exists for this game. The proof is a standard application of Rosen's existence theorem [18] , and is omitted; details may be found in [12] and [19] .
Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game defined by . Because the payoff is concave in for fixed , a vector is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following firstorder conditions are satisfied for each , where :
We will use these conditions to investigate the efficiency loss when users are price anticipating. Specifically, we are interested in comparing the aggregate surplus achieved at a Nash equilibrium to the aggregate surplus achieved at a competitive equilibrium.
It is not difficult to construct examples in which the efficiency loss is arbitrarily high, under the general assumptions we have made in this section; one such example is presented in [12] . Indeed, the knowledge that Cournot oligopoly models can yield high-efficiency loss is a generally accepted piece of folklore in the economics community; see, e.g., [20] . However, in the next theorem, we consider the important special case where marginal cost is affine. Even though the utility functions of the users may be arbitrary, we show that the efficiency loss of the resulting mechanism is no worse than 1/3 when users are price anticipating.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, and that for some , . Suppose also that for all . If is any solution to (1), (2) , and is any Nash equilibrium of the game defined by , then (9) Furthermore, this bound is tight: for every , , and , there exists a choice of and a choice of (linear) utility functions , , such that a Nash equilibrium exists with (10) Proof: The proof follows in three steps. We first show that we can assume without loss of generality that , and . Next, we show that the worst case occurs when the utility functions of the users are linear (Lemma 4). We then optimize over all games with linear utility functions to determine the worst case efficiency loss. Define , and . If , then for all ; and by (8), we have for all . But this is a sufficient condition for optimality for (1) and (2), so we conclude is an optimal solution to (1) and (2). Thus if , the bound trivially holds.
From now on we assume, without loss of generality, that . Now, for any user with , from (7) together with the fact that , we conclude that . Thus, , so that . Furthermore, since is concave, nondecreasing, and nonnegative, we have . Thus, ; since is an optimal solution to (1), (2), we have . We will use the next lemma to establish that linear utility functions yield the worst efficiency loss. The proof uses the concavity of the utility functions, and is closely related to the proof of Lemma 4 in [4] . For this reason, we omit the proof; details can be found in [12] .
Lemma 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Suppose also that for all . Fix any rate vector , and let be any optimal solution to (1), (2) . Define . If and , then the following inequality holds: (11) If we replace the utility function by a new utility function for each , where , then continues to be a Nash equilibrium, since the optimality conditions (7) and (8) Since we have restricted attention to settings where , we must also have . Thus, from (7) and the fact that , we must have ; in particular, this implies that . We start by computing the maximal aggregate surplus under these assumptions. Since the price function is , the maximal aggregate surplus is achieved when , i.e., when ; this rate is entirely allocated to user 1. The maximal aggregate surplus is thus Since the maximal aggregate surplus is fixed as , by (7) and (8) 
(15)
The objective function is the aggregate surplus associated with a Nash equilibrium allocation . The conditions (13) and (14) are equivalent to the Nash equilibrium conditions established in (7) and (8) . The constraint (15) ensures that the total allocation made at the Nash equilibrium is equal to . The constraints in (16) follow since we have restricted without loss of generality to games where . The constraint (17) ensures the rate allocated to each user is nonnegative.
We start by assuming that is fixed, and optimize only over and . In this case, we start by noting that we may assume without loss of generality that for all users . Indeed, if is a feasible solution and for some , then (13) and (14) imply that . On the other hand, if for some , we can set ; this preserves feasibility, but does not impact the term in the objective function (12) . We can, therefore, restrict attention to feasible solutions for which (18) Having done so, observe that the constraint (16) (19) , the resulting optimal value is strictly decreasing as increases; the worst case occurs as , and the optimal objective value (19) becomes (24) Furthermore, the feasibility requirements (23) on , , and become , or upon rearranging, . Until now, we have kept the price function and the total rate fixed, and found the worst case game. We now optimize over all possible choices of price function (i.e., over and ), as well as over possible Nash equilibrium rates (i.e., over ). Recall that the maximal aggregate surplus is . Thus, the worst case ratio is identified by the following optimization problem over , , and :
If we let , then this problem becomes equivalent to the following problem:
By substituting and differentiating, it is straightforward to establish that the minimum value of this optimization problem occurs at any pair and satisfying the constraints, such that . One such pair is given by , and
. At any such solution, the minimum objective value is equal to 2/3. This establishes (9) .
We now show (10), for a fixed price function with and . We choose the utility functions so that Let . It is then straightforward to check that for sufficiently large , if and for , the allocation is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the maximum aggregate surplus is achieved by choosing so that , so , , and for . Thus, the ratio of Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to maximal aggregate surplus is (25) Now, as , this ratio approaches 2/3, as required. We note that by an appropriate choice of utility functions the worst case efficiency loss is always exactly 1/3 for any affine price function.
III. GENERAL NETWORKS
In this section, we consider an extension of the single-link model to general networks. Our key contribution is to show that the generalization to a network model is a natural, scalable market mechanism: one where users choose rates over each path available, rather than at each link in the network. We show that the efficiency loss remains bounded, when marginal cost functions are affine; this is a counterpoint to the previous results on efficiency loss for the proportionally fair network resource allocation mechanism, where efficiency loss is only bounded if users submit individual bids to each link of the network [4] , [6] .
We consider a network consisting of links, or resources, numbered . As before, a set of users numbered , shares this network of resources. We assume a set of paths through the network, numbered
. By an abuse of notation, we will use , , and to also denote the sets of resources, users, and paths, respectively. Each path uses a subset of the set of resources ; if resource is used by path , we will denote this by writing . Each user has a collection of paths available through the network; if path serves user , we will denote this by writing . We will assume without loss of generality that paths are uniquely identified with users, so that for each path there exists a unique user such that . (There is no loss of generality because if two users share the same path, that is captured in our model by creating two paths which use exactly the same subset of resources.) For notational convenience, we note that the resources required by individual paths are captured by the path-resource incidence matrix , defined by if , and , otherwise. Furthermore, we can capture the relationship between paths and users by the path-user incidence matrix , defined by if , and , otherwise. Note that by our assumption on paths, for each path we have for exactly one user . Let denote the rate allocated to path , and let denote the rate allocated to user ; using the matrix , we may write the relation between and as . Furthermore, if we let denote the total rate on link , we must have
Using the matrix , we may write this constraint as . We continue to assume that user receives a utility from an allocated rate , and that each link incurs a cost when the total allocated rate at link is . We will assume that the utility functions satisfy Assumption 1, and each cost function satisfies Assumption 2; we let denote the marginal cost function associated with link .
The natural generalization of the problem (1) and (2) to a network context is given by the following optimization problem:
(26) (27) (28) (29)
We continue to refer to the objective function (26) as the aggregate surplus. Since the objective function is continuous and grows at most linearly while grows superlinearly, an optimal solution exists. Since the feasible region is convex and the cost functions are each strictly convex, the optimal vector is uniquely defined (though need not be unique). In addition, if the functions are strictly concave, then the optimal vector is uniquely defined as well. As in the previous development, we will use the optimal solution to (26)- (29) as a benchmark for the outcome of the network game.
We will consider the following network resource allocation mechanism, a natural generalization of the game considered for a single link in the previous section. Each user chooses a rate for each path ; thus the strategy of user is now a vector . The total rate demanded at link is then . We continue to assume that each link chooses a price equal to marginal cost, so that given the composite strategy vector , the price of link is . Each user then pays a total amount along each path ; thus the total payment by user is . Notice that each user is only choosing rates along each available path through the network, rather than at each link in the network. This is a much more scalable approach to network resource allocation, because users do not need to be aware of the network topology in making their rate decisions; each user only needs to know the aggregate price of each path available to him.
As in the previous development, if we assume that each user behaves as a price taker, then given a vector of prices , the payoff to user is Since we are using marginal cost pricing, we again expect price taking users to maximize aggregate surplus at a competitive equilibrium; this is formalized in the following analogue of Proposition 1, which is again a special case of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics [17] . Proposition 5: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, and that for each price function and cost function , Assumption 2 holds. There exists a competitive equilibrium, that is, a pair of vectors and such that , and
Furthermore, any such vector solves (26)-(29).
However, if each user is price anticipating, rather than price taking, the users may not maximize aggregate surplus. Consider, then, an alternative model where the users are price anticipating, and play a Cournot game to acquire a share of the links of the network. We use the notation to denote the vector of all rates chosen by users other than ; i.e.,
. Then, given , each user chooses to maximize (31) The payoff function is similar to the payoff function , except that the user now anticipates that the price at link will be set according to . A Nash equilibrium of the game defined by is a composite vector such that for all and all , there holds . As in Proposition 2, it is straightforward to show that a Nash equilibrium exists for this game.
Proposition 6: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, and that for each price function and cost function Assumption 2 holds. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game defined by . We would now like to investigate the efficiency loss by comparing the aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium to the optimal value of (26)-(29). Of course, since a single link is a special case of a general network, the efficiency loss can be arbitrarily high at a Nash equilibrium. However, it is possible to establish a bound on efficiency loss in the special case where all link price functions are affine. The key technique that we use is to show a relationship between the Nash equilibria of the game defined by , and the Nash equilibria of a game where users choose rates independently at each link. Once this equivalence is established, we can analyze the latter game using methods similar to those adopted in the network model of [4] and [5] : we reduce the analysis to individual games at each link, and then apply Theorem 3.
Theorem 7: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, and that for each , for some , . Suppose also that for all . If is any solution to (26)- (29), and is any Nash equilibrium of the game defined by , then
Proof outline: First, we define a new game where each user chooses a rate demanded at each link; the strategy of user is thus . This strategy determines the rate allocation to user at each link in the network; given this allocation, user sends at the maximum rate possible using the paths which are available. This maximum rate is the optimal value of the following max-flow optimization problem:
We denote the optimal objective value of this optimization problem by , where . Finally, the price at each link is set to , and the total payment made by user is . Thus, given a composite strategy vector , the payoff to user is
The key property of the game defined by is that any Nash equilibrium of the game defined by is related by a natural transformation to a Nash equilibrium of the game defined by ; and further, the aggregate surplus remains unchanged under this transformation. This is formalized in the following lemma. Given Lemma 8, it suffices to focus on the worst case efficiency loss in the game defined by . This game can be analyzed using techniques similar to those used in [4, Th. 7] and [5, Th. 14], so we only sketch the remainder of the proof here. If is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined by , we replace the "composite" utility function with a linear utility function , where is chosen so that is a Nash equilibrium of the new game defined by these linear utility functions. Since the "composite" utility function for user is linear in the vector of rate allocations , the network structure is no longer relevant and the game defined by decouples into Cournot games, one at each link . We finally apply Theorem 3 at each link to arrive at the bound in the theorem.
The preceding theorem extends Theorem 3 to general networks, where users may have arbitrary utility functions (subject to Assumption 1) and arbitrary paths available through the network. Observe that the key step is Lemma 8, which relates a Cournot game where users choose rates along each path to a Cournot game where users choose rates at each link. Note that this relationship is only established between Nash equilibria of the two games, but that suffices for the efficiency analysis we perform. Indeed, a direct analysis of the efficiency loss of the game defined would be much more difficult, due to the strong coupling between the players; it is not a priori clear that adverse effects such as those discovered by Hajek and Yang [6] will not occur in this context.
Finally, we also note that the preceding theorem essentially uses Theorem 3 as a "black box." Thus, any other efficiency loss bound that holds for a single-link Cournot game with arbitrary utilities (or even linear utilities, due to Lemma 4) and possibly more general cost functions can be extended to a network Cournot game where users choose rates for each path available.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has considered a simple model for network resource allocation: users choose the rate at which they want to send data, and links set prices according to the marginal cost of the total rate allocated. While such a scheme is efficient when all users are price taking, there is a loss of efficiency when users are able to anticipate the effects of their choices on the link prices. We established that this efficiency loss is bounded by 1/3 when links' marginal costs are affine.
As mentioned in the Section IIntroduction, the methods of this paper can be extended to also yield efficiency loss bounds for a number of related economic environments of interest; we note two such environments here. When a monopolist with general convex cost function faces a concave market demand curve, the "deadweight loss" due to monopoly pricing can be guaranteed to be no worse than 1/3. In addition, when multiple oligopolists with general convex cost functions face an affine market demand curve, the same bound 1/3 on efficiency loss holds. These results are the first published nontrivial constant factor bounds on efficiency loss for Cournot competition; for further details, see [21] .
The results of this paper suggest that the dual goals of scalable network mechanism design and robustness to selfish users can indeed be achieved, at least under some specific assumptions on the cost structure of the links. An interesting further direction, therefore, concerns the design of a network resource allocation mechanism that is scalable, and provides efficiency loss bounds regardless of the structure of the cost functions. 
